Episode 41

Longevity Breakthrough or Expensive Dead End? How Investors Decide, with LongeVC’s Sergey Jakimov

Published on: 2nd November, 2026

Billions are flowing into longevity and biotech, but how do investors tell a genuine breakthrough from an expensive scientific dead end? Sergey Jakimov, founding and managing partner of LongeVC, joins Daphna Stern on Beyond Longevity to explain how investors decide which companies deserve backing. He says his team has reviewed almost 5,000 companies since 2021 and invested in only a tiny fraction.

Sergey shares the problems he sees again and again: overstated science, weak intellectual property and no credible route through clinical trials and regulatory approval. He also explains why some early longevity investors lost money, what AI can realistically change in drug discovery, and why clinical trial results do not always reflect patients’ quality of life. Throughout, he argues that longevity companies must ultimately prove themselves by treating real diseases.

About the guest

Sergey Jakimov is a founding and managing partner of LongeVC, an investment firm focused on early-stage biotech and longevity, backing companies developing medicines for conditions including cancer, heart disease and diseases of the brain.

He has co-founded three deep-tech companies, including the health-data company Longenesis, and co-founded the Longevity Science Foundation. His LongeVC biography credits him with raising more than $50 million for his own ventures and through his work as an entrepreneur in residence. Longenesis reports that its tools have supported more than half a million participants in the UAE's Emirati Genome Programme.

Links

LongeVC: https://longevc.com/

linkedin.com/in/jakimov

Chapters

00:00 How Do Investors Judge Longevity Science?

01:50 Sergey’s Experience of Neurological Illness

04:12 Treating Disease or Targeting Ageing?

06:33 From Engineering to Biotech

09:06 Why Clinical Trials Struggle to Recruit Patients

13:35 How Biotech Investors Choose What to Back

17:00 Why Results in Mice Can Fail in Humans

20:17 Alzheimer’s Drugs and the Amyloid Debate

23:01 Biotech Due Diligence Red Flags

28:17 Family Offices and the Risks of Longevity Investing

30:13 Investing Through a Specialist Biotech Fund

31:27 Why Specialisation Matters in Biotech

32:12 Why LongeVC Backs So Few Companies

33:13 Biotech Fund Timelines and Exits

34:13 Computing Power, Manufacturing and Clinical Trial Bottlenecks

36:42 What Can AI Really Change in Drug Discovery?

38:47 Why LongeVC Invested in Rubedo

39:30 How Do Longevity Treatments Get Regulatory Approval?

44:26 How Much Money Does a Biotech Company Need?

47:30 How Investors Decide on Follow-on Funding

49:27 How Venture Capital Investors Support Founders

51:43 European and US Venture Capital Compared

54:11 Rapid Fire on Joy, Exercise and Longevity Myths

57:02 From Promising Science to Useful Treatments

Transcript
Speaker A:

Foreign.

Speaker A:

Welcome to Beyond Longevity, the podcast that explores not just how we age, but how we can build a longer, healthier future for ourselves.

Speaker A:

Billions are being invested in longevity and biotech, but how do investors tell the difference between a breakthrough in the making and an expensive scientific dead end?

Speaker A:

My guest today is Sergei Yakimov, managing partner and founding partner of Longevc, an investment firm focused on early stage biotech and longevity.

Speaker A:

He has co founded three deep tech companies, including the health data company Long Genesis, helped raise more than $50 million in venture funding, and co founded the Longevity Science Foundation.

Speaker A:

companies since:

Speaker A:

Only very few make the cut.

Speaker A:

So what actually makes a longevity company worth backing?

Speaker A:

Why can apparently strong science still make bad investment?

Speaker A:

And why do promising companies still lose the investment?

Speaker A:

Sergei sees the same problems again and again.

Speaker A:

Overstated science, weak ip, and no credible path through regulations.

Speaker A:

We also discuss why investors lost money chasing the idea of curing aging.

Speaker A:

What AI could realistically change in draft discovery, the problem hidden inside clinical trials, and why Sergei believes longevity companies ultimately have to prove themselves by treating real diseases.

Speaker A:

Hi, Sergei.

Speaker A:

Welcome to Beyond Longevity.

Speaker A:

You co founded Longevity, an investment fund backing young companies developing new medicines, including treatments like cancer, heart disease, diseases of the brain, and you helped decide which areas are worth funding.

Speaker A:

But I want to begin with something that happened to you is you were in your late 20s when a neurological illness left you partly paralyzed.

Speaker A:

And you said that the problem to help you was not a financial issue because paying more would not have brought a better treatment, because medicine just didn't have an answer for you.

Speaker A:

Tell us what happened.

Speaker B:

Well, first and foremost, thanks for having me.

Speaker B:

Look, I see you've done your homework, which is reassuring.

Speaker B:

There is a disclaimer to that, right?

Speaker B:

So in no way, shape or form, whatever happened to me and kind of my own patient journey has to a certain extent resulted into what we do as a fund or I do in our industry, et cetera.

Speaker B:

It did shape certain perspectives on the patient journey, on the disease burden in certain patient populations, the quality of life considerations and whatnot.

Speaker B:

But again, the disclaimer is we were doing whatever we were doing even before that.

Speaker B:

So it's kind of me exploring a different perspective on our industry.

Speaker B:

Somewhere along the way, I basically ended up was, what, 27, 28, something like that?

Speaker B:

I ended up being diagnosed a rare disease patient on the neurological and the neurodegenerative side of things.

Speaker B:

And neurodegenerative diseases, they come in all shapes and sizes.

Speaker B:

The exact name of mine will not give you much.

Speaker B:

I think the closest one that you can actually think of is multiple sclerosis, which is more well known, I guess.

Speaker B:

But then again, the mechanism of autoimmune neurological conditions is somewhat the same, right?

Speaker B:

It's your body attacking your own neurons, which leads to all sorts of mobility issues, all sorts of neural information issues, loss of function, et cetera, et cetera.

Speaker B:

So, and then, you know, the cadence differs and, and the exact conditions differ, but kind of the, the gist remains the same.

Speaker B:

And so, yeah, I mean, I, and I was pretty vocal about this, I guess, because it has to do with one of the ways of how we look at our field to a certain extent.

Speaker B:

And truth to be told, again, we have been looking at our field in this way even, even before this happened.

Speaker B:

And that is in certain disease areas, if we're talking about age related diseases, if we're talking about autoimmune diseases, the overall dialogue and kind of the overall narrative about longevity and living longer and you know, what do we do to maximize our lifespan?

Speaker B:

Which doesn't make sense.

Speaker B:

You need to maximize healthspan.

Speaker B:

But nevertheless, so what do we do to, to live to 150?

Speaker B:

It kind of stops making sense to a certain point because what we haven't yet figured out is how do we essentially tackle certain conditions, which, I mean, sometimes we call them horizons of mortality, you can call them horizons to, you know, functional living, whatever, right?

Speaker B:

So something that takes you out prematurely and kind of restricts you from living your maximal biological timeline, which is what, 120 years or so.

Speaker B:

So before talking about maximizing longevity and whatnot, we really need to figure out how to deal with these more down to earth things.

Speaker B:

And that was my thesis.

Speaker B:

Exactly right.

Speaker B:

So what I was saying, and I still stick to it, is in most age related conditions, the patient outcome very often on the quality of life after the treatment, if there is any quality of life at all, does not really correlate with the amount of money you actually spend on treating yourself.

Speaker B:

Right?

Speaker B:

So to a certain point, of course, financial capacity would allow you to access better treatment or let's say a better clinical center.

Speaker B:

But at the end of the day, in certain disease areas that are still unsolved, you're kind of left alone.

Speaker B:

And very often you are left alone with protocols that are, you know, 20, 30, 40 years old, such as in neuro, very often patients are left alone with, you know, your standard corticosteroid protocols, which are very old, have a ton of side effects, and doesn't really guarantee a good quality of life afterwards.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So that, that was kind of the thesis behind.

Speaker B:

And I, I still stick to, to the thesis.

Speaker B:

I still kind of tangle this thesis in a way into how we approach our industry, which is we do not really invest in fighting aging.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

We invest in diseases and fighting diseases in a radical way.

Speaker B:

And I still think that we're not there yet in terms of like as a field to be eligible to talk about holistic longevity.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Because we haven't sorted out very down to earth problems.

Speaker A:

You've mentioned so many interesting things.

Speaker A:

I want to come back to all of them.

Speaker A:

But let's go back a little bit because I think you started out in engineering.

Speaker B:

I did, yeah.

Speaker A:

So what took you from engineering into medicine?

Speaker B:

Well, I can't say I'm in medicine first and foremost.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So I am biotech, which is slightly different.

Speaker B:

I was interested in medicine when I was a teenager.

Speaker B:

I wanted to become a neurosurgeon.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

That was kind of the ambition because of multiple factories in my childhood, financial, geographical, whatever, pick one.

Speaker B:

I was not able to, I didn't go to medical school, so instead I did my education elsewhere.

Speaker B:

So in a different field, which was I majored in quantitative methods eventually.

Speaker B:

And I thought, well, I might end up in the life sciences in one day.

Speaker B:

Before that I, well, I didn't have any chances to end up in life sciences as a specialist, like as a scientist or as an MD or whoever with a profession because I felt that it was kind of too late to pursue it.

Speaker B:

Maybe I was wrong actually.

Speaker B:

Maybe, you know, in my 20s I should have gone to like the neurosurgery route and never, never looks back.

Speaker B:

I don't know.

Speaker B:

But again, the history doesn't work in retrospect.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So that, that is something that, that we'll never figure out.

Speaker B:

And, and I started by trying to build a deep tech company.

Speaker B:

I, I tried, well, approaching kind of these hard science subjects and, and, and deep tech, hard ip, whatever you want to call it, from the entrepreneurial standpoint.

Speaker B:

And this is how the first engineering company was born.

Speaker B:

That was in all fairness, the only company not in biotech I was ever involved with.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And then the second one was in medical devices.

Speaker B:

And then at some point it turned out that there is kind of, there is a playbook to a certain point of how, you know, deep tech companies are run and how deep tech companies are started.

Speaker B:

Like back in the days I'm kind of sounding like I'm very old, which I'm not.

Speaker B:

But back in the days, the startup environment Was slightly different when I was 22, 23, like raising for the first company, the fundraising environment was very different.

Speaker B:

The number of case studies where people were actually repeatedly starting businesses in different domains and were successful in different domains, the number of these case studies was also less so or these were, you know, less vocal.

Speaker B:

So nevertheless, yeah, I tried to, I tried to approach this kind of from a repeatable way.

Speaker B:

And this is how I ended up in medical and then I ended up essentially in drug discovery and therapeutics.

Speaker B:

And through that we ended up starting a fund eventually.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And then we ended up on the other side of the river, which is investing in founders rather than building ourselves.

Speaker A:

Because one of the earliest companies you founded was Long Genesis, I think is a Latvian health tech company and its online tools helped research studies and the people gave permission for their health data to be used.

Speaker A:

Right.

Speaker A:

That company's been used by the Emirati Genome program in the uae.

Speaker A:

And what did building that business teach you about why medical research gets stuck?

Speaker B:

So Logenesis was first and foremost we co founded, I co founded it, right.

Speaker B:

And we were with three co founders actually building that company.

Speaker B:

One of the co founders was now my co founder in the fund Fund one, fund two.

Speaker B:

We kind of moved on to build funds together.

Speaker B:

When Genesis first and foremost was a data company, right.

Speaker B:

It was a, still is a clinical data company where we started with the premise that it is very hard to recruit patients for clinical trials.

Speaker B:

So it's one of the bottlenecks, especially when we were about like more complicated disease areas or disease areas with high cadence of disease progression, right, where, where patients do not really get stuck in one phase.

Speaker B:

They, they actually, you know, they either die or, or they just progress through disease quickly.

Speaker B:

It is very hard to identify them and recruit them.

Speaker B:

So yeah, longenesis started as essentially a tool that extracted anonymized metadata from patient custodian institutions, which is hospitals, patient associations, essentially everyone that keeps, keeps patients together, same guards patients and used that data anonymously again to help study sponsors identify best fitting subjects for clinical trials.

Speaker B:

And it turned out to be successful and that this company evolved into creating a range of real world data capture tools.

Speaker B:

And we ended up building for the Emirati Genome program for the Emirati government, working with Big Pharma, et cetera.

Speaker B:

But so we were in the space of enabling secondary health data use at a certain point.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

If we're talking about the specific problems we're dealing with, I mean one of the most vocal ones of course is, is rare diseases.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

One of the biggest issues out there is a lot of rare disease patients are undiagnosed or very scattered.

Speaker B:

So you kind of have this shadow disease ridden population where even in conditions, again, I've mentioned Ms.

Speaker B:

Already.

Speaker B:

We can as well use this example again, Ms. Is not really considered to be a rare disease anymore, which is actually frightening.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

It's super prevalent as a condition, yet there are essentially double digit percentage numbers potentially of patients that are undiagnosed.

Speaker B:

They have the symptoms, but they were never actually screened for the specific conditions and given the diagnosis and never treated as such.

Speaker B:

The same thing is in rare diseases.

Speaker B:

So I think one of the most problematic areas there is capturing these rare disease patients, kind of unlocking them for potential trial enrollment, eventually trying to influence the quality of life in these specific very niche, very bracketed patient populations.

Speaker B:

That is by far one of the biggest bottlenecks.

Speaker B:

The other bottleneck is, I mean, if we're talking clinical trials in general, what one needs to understand about clinical trials is that very often they're designed to deliver a certain result.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Which means that inclusion, exclusion criteria that are a part of a clinical trial design are made in a way that would try to maximize the chances of a drug to work.

Speaker B:

Which again is problematic because we're not exactly speaking about the real world use case with a heterogeneous patient population.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And that has historically, by the way, led to multiple failures of already approved drugs.

Speaker B:

And you know, Alzheimer's is a great area to look into.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So we had multiple drugs there which were basically called off by FDA at some point because they just didn't work.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Although they kind of passed the minimal thresholds in clinical trials.

Speaker B:

So a lot of these nuances there.

Speaker B:

You also will notice at some point that very often clinical trials have actually little to do with the life quality of patients or trying to demonstrate life quality of patients, and have very much to do with designing them in a way that there are certain biomarkers, there are certain endpoints to be hit in certain quantities.

Speaker B:

So that's, I guess like the second, maybe less obvious for the broader public nuance in that work.

Speaker B:

But yeah, I mean, we built a data company essentially that was a data.

Speaker A:

Company, to sum it up, what you've said in sort of very basic terms, it is a money business creating drugs.

Speaker A:

And while everybody wants to help the world and do better, at the end of the day, the bottom line has to add up.

Speaker A:

When you look at different illnesses and treatments that treat those illnesses or diseases or whatever you want to call it before they exist, before there is A possible answer.

Speaker A:

You still have to decide what deserves backing and what doesn't.

Speaker A:

How do you make that decision?

Speaker A:

What are you looking for that makes you think, okay, this treatment is worth backing?

Speaker B:

You look at multiple things.

Speaker B:

I mean a, you have your thesis, which is you kind of decide before you start investing of, you know, what sort of opportunities I will be looking at and as a consequence of it, what sort of opportunities will I be sourcing, right?

Speaker B:

That hugely determines like what sort of institutions you're working with, you know, where's your dealfall coming from, et cetera.

Speaker B:

So that's A, that's your thesis.

Speaker B:

B, you are even in early stages operating with a limited yet somewhat present set of clinical preclinical data, right?

Speaker B:

So you're looking at most probably first in vivo data, which is mice or some sort of animal models.

Speaker B:

The ideal case scenario there is the very first in vitro validation, especially if we're talking us, which I admit it's gotten worse with the new administration which, which came in because a lot of non deletive funding was cut.

Speaker B:

But realistically, a lot of early validation, a lot of early science, fundamental science is done by using public funding, right?

Speaker B:

So grants.

Speaker B:

So as an early stage investor you kind of get to see the company when the company is already in possession of some sort of first animal data.

Speaker B:

So that's point two, point three.

Speaker B:

You would always look at the team behind it as trivial as it sounds.

Speaker B:

You look at the profiles of people, you look at the balance within the team, which is you do not really fund strictly scientifically based companies.

Speaker B:

You really want someone who has some sort of understanding of how to talk with the market and how to start these potentially industrial partnerships, conversations, et cetera with institutionals, because that's going to be needed.

Speaker B:

You look heavily on, well again, trivial IP position, not interesting.

Speaker B:

What is interesting, you look at the overall understanding of the team, of what it takes to actually get this to a value inflection point.

Speaker B:

That's really important actually.

Speaker B:

So a lot of times you start talking with the team and you might like the science, but then what you realize is that the people behind do not really have a. I do hate cliche terms in the startup environment, so I won't use the term vision, right?

Speaker B:

The outlook of what are the steps or what is the sequence of steps that they would actually need to undertake in order to arrive somewhere.

Speaker B:

And that has to do with the regulatory path, that has to do with all sorts of logistics around GMP manufacturing, around choosing CROs for their clinical work, around understanding how interact Meetings with FDA work, how an IMD submission works, et cetera.

Speaker B:

And no one has a crystal ball, right, which is totally fine.

Speaker B:

You never know what future brings.

Speaker B:

But you need to be prepared to talk about the future, at least in some sort of shape or form that's easily achievable just by doing your homework really.

Speaker B:

So that's three and four.

Speaker B:

The kind of, the peculiarity of being an early stage investor in biotech is that you're operating with data that has been generated on models that very, very vaguely and sometimes like stupidly shallow represent the human models, which means in neurodegenerative diseases, I mean, we're looking at mice, right, with gene knockouts that have developed Alzheimer's, which makes a little sense because mice A, do not develop Alzheimer's, B, these are essentially inferior organisms as compared to a human being, right?

Speaker B:

They're much, much less complicated and, and metabolically it works in a totally different way in, in, in, in people.

Speaker B:

So we of course end up as an industry, we end up kind of just improving the lives of rodents to a certain extent more often than improving lives of people with these results.

Speaker B:

So you are kind of in the territory where you make your best guess about the translatability of science, how it's going to translate into humans, if at all.

Speaker B:

You make your best, that's not a guess.

Speaker B:

You make your best research effort in terms of looking at what groups have done work in these fields and what sort of publications are there and what sort of essentially trivia there is on a specific topic because there are rarely targets that people haven't looked at at this point.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And then, you know, there, there's always some research.

Speaker B:

Another stick, stick in your wheel in that regard is that, and that issue is being more and more spoken about these days is most of the research is not reproducible, most of the published stuff is actually, I wouldn't say it's half fake, but it is very hard to reproduce most of the studies.

Speaker B:

So that gives you limited understanding of whether some biology that you're looking at, especially if it's moderately novel biology, is going to work.

Speaker B:

So yeah, I mean it's, it's, it's making your best guess, thinking it with your thesis at some point, also kind of sharing the responsibility with your co investors to a certain point and then at the end of the day trying to gear up as much, as much as you can in terms of the variety of opinions around you.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

I mean, if you look at our scientific advisory board, if you look at our team, you Kind of try to have as many potentially conflicting.

Speaker B:

The more conflicting the better, actually views in the room around the specific issue you're trying to tackle.

Speaker B:

This is where somewhat you try to find this way forward or not with a specific company.

Speaker B:

Again, I'm talking about, if we're talking about like things like AI for drug disc, you know, any other infrastructural plays, then it's, it's a bit different.

Speaker B:

You're looking at early market validation, you're looking at the unique moat, you're looking at how this stacks up with others in the market, which is in case, for example, of AI oversaturated as of now.

Speaker B:

So you kind of have a different methodology and a different playbook of how you evaluate these companies as you have a different methodology for evaluating companies in the diagnostic space.

Speaker B:

But by far, of course, therapeutics, early stage therapeutics, they're the most lucrative in terms of the upside and they are the most challenging in terms of the kind of guesswork that you need to do.

Speaker A:

So it's just very interesting you mentioned work in mice for Alzheimer's because just a couple of weeks ago I had on a guest who's creating a memetic drug that works beautifully in mice to help with Alzheimer's or mice that have been, you know, given the Alzheimer genes.

Speaker A:

And it's very hard to translate that to human studies because they are so different.

Speaker A:

So when she's doing quite well on it.

Speaker A:

But it's, it's as you said, because.

Speaker B:

You're treating the effect, not the cause, that that's the issue.

Speaker B:

So with Alzheimer's, you.

Speaker B:

What you do is you're kind of in this interesting position where you don't know why the disease appears.

Speaker B:

You don't know.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So you cannot mimic it.

Speaker B:

You cannot mimic properly.

Speaker B:

You can mimic something that, that you don't know the cause of.

Speaker B:

So what you can do is you can mimic the visual clues of that disease.

Speaker B:

And that is you knock out a certain gene in a mouse and then the mouse starts developing plaques in the brain, and then you try to clear out the plaques and whatnot.

Speaker B:

But that is borderline useless just because you don't know why they appeared in the first place.

Speaker B:

And you are doing it in an organism that does not develop plaques naturally.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Because there are no mice with Alzheimer's in nature.

Speaker B:

Oh, by the way.

Speaker B:

And that's actually a very good example of how the whole industry can chase the wrong thesis for 20 years and spend like tens and hundreds of billions of dollars on it, right.

Speaker B:

Which is the amyloid hypothesis in Alzheimer's, which started off with a paper in, what was it, early 90s or something, which is, by the way, not reproducible as well as it turned out.

Speaker B:

And.

Speaker B:

Yeah, and then the whole field just started chasing the thing and we got very good at clearing the plaques and it didn't really affect the disease progression.

Speaker B:

And here we are.

Speaker B:

Right, so there are multiple cases like that.

Speaker B:

I mean, if you, if you dig into the rare disease area, every second disease, you basically don't know why it appears.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And you try to chase the bullets from the gun where you don't know where the gun is and how it came about in the first place.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So that's not very efficient.

Speaker A:

Absolutely not.

Speaker A:

But it's again, it's sort of fishing in the dark.

Speaker A:

And that's why I wanted to ask you that question because you're an early investor, obviously, and it's a lot of, I don't want to say guesswork, but.

Speaker B:

A lot of educated guesswork.

Speaker A:

Educated guesswork because already the translation from mice to human is so tricky or often impossible that I find it quite impressive, especially with your track record of how you are able to pick the winners, let's call them, because, yeah, that's pretty amazing.

Speaker B:

By being nerds, by being very nerdy, you go by the, by the mantra of you don't know what you don't know.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So you can't really say whether something will translate into something or not.

Speaker B:

What you can do is you can equip yourself with as much data as possible and as much competencies of looking at this data from different angles as possible.

Speaker B:

That's pretty much it.

Speaker B:

So you look for patterns, you look for inconsistencies in data, you look for non obvious, sometimes anecdotal evidence that something works.

Speaker B:

And that is, by the way, a very interesting field in our industry, anecdotal evidence where certain drugs that were prescribed to treat a certain condition did not really work in that condition, yet they were almost 100% efficient in something else and they got reformulated and repurposed and now they are very efficient and something that they were not designed for.

Speaker B:

Which kind of speaks to the fact of how mysteriously biology works sometimes.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So yeah, you just, you just be a nerd and kind of stick with it.

Speaker B:

That's what we, what we arrived at.

Speaker B:

We have so far not found a way of how to not spend all possible resource that we have on the due diligence.

Speaker B:

Yeah, I guess you can just ride the bandwagon with other guys and Maybe just join rounds where someone credible, quote unquote, is joining.

Speaker B:

But I haven't found a single argument for this to, to defy the whole purpose of your own reasoning.

Speaker B:

Like you should really have your own view.

Speaker B:

And we've had cases where everyone was super excited.

Speaker B:

We were not and we shared why we were not.

Speaker B:

And then the whole ground fell apart, unfortunately.

Speaker B:

Because of us.

Speaker B:

Right?

Speaker B:

Because we found something that others just did not want to find.

Speaker B:

A great example by the way, of how this works with the investor crowd very often is the outspoken, you know, for example, Tarano or something.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Which again, it's just a case of failed due diligence and it's a failed due diligence of on top of FOMO and then ignored due diligence as well.

Speaker B:

And kind of the first guy failed, got excited, got the second guy in, and then it just snowballed from there.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Although the whole case wouldn't have happened really if a proper due diligence at some point, early stage was conducted.

Speaker B:

So there you have it.

Speaker B:

You kind of try to avoid these things and.

Speaker B:

Yeah.

Speaker A:

So tell me, what did you see that the others didn't see?

Speaker B:

We usually look for wishful thinking in the data.

Speaker B:

Very often foundries.

Speaker B:

Lying is a bad word.

Speaker B:

I don't think founders lie specifically.

Speaker B:

Very often founders want to see something that is not there.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And very often founders try to imply certain visions of bright future which do not really grounded in the early data that they have.

Speaker B:

And this is something that you try to call out usually.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So that's one all sorts of IP inconsistencies is the second one.

Speaker B:

Very little time, interestingly enough in some due diligence processes is spent on actually reading licensing agreements that companies have.

Speaker B:

And then at some point you might find out that the company doesn't really have rights or certain critical rights to do an M and A after Right.

Speaker B:

So you'll be stuck with an asset which can perform even right.

Speaker B:

But there's no right to sell things like that.

Speaker B:

It's usually the details and again you just dig through it.

Speaker A:

But it's quite shocking because to be honest, these are very basic things that you're mentioning.

Speaker A:

You're not mentioning any, oh, you know, I found some secret thing that was hidden deep somewhere.

Speaker A:

These are very basic things that you'd think anybody producing a simple business plan would have covered.

Speaker A:

I'm quite surprised to hear that people approach investors without having those real basic things covered.

Speaker A:

I know, you know, making things look better than they are, that I can understand their point of view.

Speaker A:

But not knowing if you have the.

Speaker B:

IP rights, I think, I think you're underestimating the power of like the good old fake it till you make it approach.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Especially early stages, like we're going to figure this out somewhere later on because we need to move and we need to raise, et cetera, et cetera.

Speaker B:

We need to sustain the team and at some point the whole bandwagon is just moving too fast to stop it anymore.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

As with a lot of these viral cases in our field, so sometimes the most obvious things are hidden in plain sight.

Speaker B:

It's not that you need to pretend that you're a detective genius.

Speaker B:

I mean sometimes it's just if the deal looks bad, it's bad.

Speaker B:

You know, if the data is lacking, you don't try to find it elsewhere.

Speaker B:

It's just, it's not there.

Speaker B:

Things like that.

Speaker B:

I've been, and I think our team has been also through this period of always searching for double meaning, always searching for something non obvious, always assuming that there's some sort of black swan event that is going to come and this company, which is totally not obvious to win right now, will win everyone.

Speaker B:

And once in a while these things happen.

Speaker B:

Of course, although in most of the cases statistics is against you, which is if it looks bad, it's bad.

Speaker B:

Move on.

Speaker A:

Do you think that because biotech, medtech, all that, you know, the research is such a hot topic in the investment field that a lot of family offices especially just are so keen to jump on the bandwagon that they don't do their due diligence properly.

Speaker B:

What happens is a lot of family offices get their enthusiasm killed by not doing due diligence.

Speaker B:

Longevity is a good example as a field.

Speaker B:

If you look at early:

Speaker B:

The whole narrative of let's fight aging, aging is a disease, we're going to cure aging and then all the age related disease will never happen.

Speaker B:

That was like on top of everyone's minds in the longevity space.

Speaker B:

Like when in:

Speaker B:

Like that's bs.

Speaker B:

There is no endpoint.

Speaker B:

Why, why bother?

Speaker B:

I mean that's not the VC territory, people were, you know, borderline aggressive sometimes.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

About us not sharing the vision and, and, and whatnot.

Speaker B:

Where in reality a lot of early capital, which was also family offices because remember family offices very often are individually driven and aging and age related diseases Very often also kind of pushes the button of personal motivation in family office.

Speaker A:

It pulls at the heartstrings, you know.

Speaker B:

Yeah, and someone had a case in the family, you know, someone, someone is afraid of dying from off stage.

Speaker B:

Someone has a condition that cannot be addressed with, with current methods.

Speaker B:

So that drives investment very often.

Speaker B:

And a lot of this early capital that rushed into we're going to cure aging in the next decade just got written off.

Speaker B:

And a lot of family offices actually are now kind of staying away from the space.

Speaker B:

Some of them are returning, but some of them are staying away because they just brutally got, got washed out with their bets.

Speaker B:

So my usual advice to, to family offices actually and any sort of unspecialized capital is join the group that is specialized capital.

Speaker B:

Like don't be afraid of becoming an lp.

Speaker B:

Just be an LP with people that will share stuff with you.

Speaker B:

Learning from people that have spent their whole life in a very specific field is a way better strategy than waking up in the morning and trying to deploy in biotech, which you do not necessarily understand.

Speaker B:

So that's kind of the situation with family offices.

Speaker B:

Then you have another category which is catch all funds, right, which are, you know, and the catch all was kind of the strategy where, you know, I put a bit in wearables, I put a bid in whatever cancer and then I put a bit in Alzheimer's and then I back vitamins and then you know, maybe something else.

Speaker A:

Hedging your bets, which is kind of.

Speaker B:

A trick of all trades.

Speaker B:

The master of none type of situation.

Speaker B:

And that capital also that, that's a bit of a casino type of endeavor for me.

Speaker B:

Like this is, this is gambling.

Speaker B:

Sometimes it works, I mean never works for me.

Speaker B:

Like I, I, I'm not the person who would win a lottery, so I wouldn't even try.

Speaker B:

In our case we just stick to what we know.

Speaker B:

And that is we stick to a very niche segment of what we know.

Speaker B:

And as you are, when you become a specialist in something very very niche, you start understanding how to diversify.

Speaker B:

Even within this very, very niche segment, in reality there are multiple sub segments into it.

Speaker B:

So we kind of observe from the distance.

Speaker B:

We do have family offices as our LPs in the first fund and the second fund.

Speaker B:

We try our best to get them into deals, we try our best to get them into allocations to talk with our advisory board and educating them essentially as much as possible because they, you know, they trusted us, we tried to return the favor.

Speaker B:

But yeah, a lot of that capital unfortunately is a lost for our Field.

Speaker A:

Now you are very precise in who you back because I think you back fewer than 1% of applicants.

Speaker A:

Is that because you have so, so many applicants or because you're very tight in your vetting?

Speaker B:

Has both.

Speaker B:

The first fund looked at almost 3,000 companies back 20.

Speaker B:

think total throughout since:

Speaker B:

Like we've seen these companies at some point, especially the ones that have been around for some time and we track most of them.

Speaker B:

Yeah.

Speaker B:

In some cases we don't invest not because the company's bad, it's because the time is not right, because the evidence is still not because we want to wait it out or it doesn't really fit with the holding period of the fund anymore.

Speaker B:

There are multiple reasons why VC doesn't invest really.

Speaker B:

And it's the same for us.

Speaker B:

It's not only because we say that the science is not convincing for us.

Speaker B:

Multiple reasons.

Speaker A:

Do you have a certain timeframe for your roi for the return on the investment or does it depend when you.

Speaker B:

Run close ended funds, which.

Speaker B:

Every classic VC runs a closed ended fund, you know, with some very notable exceptions such as Sequoias of the world, which are evergreens.

Speaker B:

But with a close ended fund you kind of have the, you kind of have the lifetime of the fund which is the period of your investments plus the period of your portfolio management and that's it.

Speaker B:

The first fund is seven years for us, the second fund is 10 years, so five plus five, essentially five years for investments, five years for essentially fully liquidating the portfolio.

Speaker B:

The sooner the better, essentially.

Speaker B:

But, but then again you kind of want to time it in a proper way where very often secondary opportunities appear faster.

Speaker B:

But you don't want to do a secondary opportunity.

Speaker B:

You actually believe that the company's gonna do like the full liquidity event and then you want to just sit it out and take more from it.

Speaker B:

But yeah, it's, it's usually driven by the lifetime of the fund.

Speaker A:

I've had the head of Healthcare Innovations from Nebius on not too long ago and he was mentioning that a big problem that these startups or research, new research companies, whatever that they have in finding investment is that they have not calculated in the computing powers that they need.

Speaker A:

Is that something you find?

Speaker A:

Does that matter to you?

Speaker A:

How important is that to you?

Speaker B:

It is actually very interesting.

Speaker B:

So in this specific example, the term computing power, I mean we can use it in relation directly to AI for Drug discovery folks which are, you know, compute heavy and AI heavy.

Speaker B:

We also can can use it as like a catch all term for all the infrastructural costs that you need to bear.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Because with therapeutics it's essentially the same thing.

Speaker B:

In therapeutics there are so many bottlenecks when it comes to third parties and services that you need to procure and you need to prepay and you need to pre book sometimes years in advance that the whole thing actually becomes like a planning game.

Speaker B:

And that planning game should go hand in hand with fundraising, but it rarely does unfortunately.

Speaker B:

And so for an early stage therapeutic startup, for example, hopefully you will see very often is that the company is trying to raise, to raise a pre, preclinical round or just raise the pre clinical round.

Speaker B:

But in order to do any meaningful work for their IND submission, for example, or even you know, phase one trials somewhere two years in.

Speaker B:

From this point they need to prepay GMP manufacturing almost like now they need to prepay CRO services if they want the proper like you know, a big name CRO working for them, for example.

Speaker B:

And then you have this anecdotal situation where progress wise they're not there yet and valuation wise they're not there yet either because they need much more money that they can raise now at the valuation that they're at right now without diluting them out of the company completely.

Speaker B:

But if they don't prepay, they might be stuck in a situation where they cannot proceed with clinical work after.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And that, that has to do with inefficiencies within our field in general.

Speaker B:

Like the whole service segment is just screwed up.

Speaker B:

CROs are overloaded, there are very few proper ones with proper recruiting capacity.

Speaker B:

GMP manufacturing is even worse.

Speaker B:

So the whole thing is just like one big traffic jam.

Speaker B:

Pretty much.

Speaker B:

But coming back to the Nebius example.

Speaker B:

Yeah.

Speaker B:

So the AI for drug discovery folks is something way, way different.

Speaker B:

So the head of our advisory board is Alex, right, the founder of Ancilico.

Speaker B:

So we know the thing or two about building an AI for drug discovery company and that company being successful eventually and compute is part of the equation.

Speaker B:

I guess in all honesty we kind of low key stop looking at pure AI for drug discovery plays these days because it's going to get redundant very soon because the foundational labs were taking over because you are clawed for life sciences in the next nine months will be able to design molecules in house.

Speaker B:

So a lot of companies that do not really have a very differentiated moat, they're just going to Become obsolete pretty much.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So in AI for drug discovery, you really look at those who have managed to create their own assets.

Speaker B:

And yes, it kind of needs a lot of compute.

Speaker B:

And very often guys like Navius, actually they do a lot of partnerships with early AI for drug discovery companies, you know, to speed up their research.

Speaker B:

Sometimes the most obvious thing for these guys is to build their own compute, you know, but that's kind of the bigger play already.

Speaker B:

But most of them end up building their own and not depending on these kind of shrinking resources in the industry.

Speaker B:

But yeah, in general as a field, you either get much more specialized these days or you get a clever infusion of software and hardware, which is, you know, an AI driven robotic lab, something like that.

Speaker B:

Because the pure AI for drug discovery play, especially if you are running not on your own assets, so you are not transforming into a pharma company, but you rather try to pull off the business model of providing service to someone that's going to become obsolete really soon.

Speaker B:

And compute will not be your biggest issue.

Speaker B:

It's going to be the competition from the others.

Speaker A:

Let's go a bit more into detail.

Speaker A:

I want to talk about one of the companies that you did back Rubedo Life Science, which is, you know, biotech company.

Speaker A:

What was the strongest evidence when you decided to invest in it?

Speaker A:

What persuaded you and what happened since?

Speaker A:

And how close is it to producing something, you know, useful for patients?

Speaker B:

Well, I think Rubedo is extremely close.

Speaker B:

I mean, Rubedo is, I would say, the only longevity, quote, unquote company or the company that relies on initially longevity, like aging biology type of thesis that is currently in phase 2 clinical, which is very close to producing something meaningful to patients.

Speaker B:

I think there is like a broader story to be told, right?

Speaker B:

What would it take for a longevity company to actually prove its worth in the field?

Speaker B:

Well, what it would take is learning that there are certain parts that cannot be moved and that is the regulatory framework.

Speaker B:

That is the way how fda, for example, looks at things.

Speaker B:

That is the logic of the whole moving with the traffic type of situation, with, you know, the sequence of events that you need to undergo, which is preclinical work and the enabling, then clinical work, et cetera.

Speaker B:

And here lies the problem.

Speaker B:

A lot of aging biology type of companies have always historically looked at holistic thesis, which means like in Robito's case, Robito is thesis rests on senescent cell clearance, right?

Speaker B:

If you take senescent cells, a lot of companies before that were like, well, we're gonna do senolytics and Senolytics, the drugs that clear out senescent cells.

Speaker B:

So we're gonna clear out senescent cells and it's gonna do so much good to the body.

Speaker B:

Right where that thesis is good for maybe a grant or something, it's no good for a vc and it's totally not good for an FDA official looking at it, because what you need is a disease indication.

Speaker B:

And in order to get the disease indication, you need to focus your technology to a certain mechanism of action in a certain system in the body and essentially try to pierce the things together, understanding what am I improving and what am I treating here.

Speaker B:

And Robita was one of these, it still is in my mind, one of these poster child cases that we have right now, at least, where it is a longevity company that has managed to figure out how to narrow down their longevity narrative for it to tackle certain disease conditions and go after a specific disease indication that allows you to squeeze your thesis into the narrative that the FDA understands that the industry understands, that enables you to partner with pharma, things like that.

Speaker B:

So, so, and, and Robito did, did this.

Speaker B:

I mean, they figured out that not all senescent cells are bad.

Speaker B:

There is no essentially umbrella term that, that will be applicable to, to the body.

Speaker B:

Like, there is no like senescent cell period.

Speaker B:

There are senescence, different types of senescent cells that are typical to different diseases.

Speaker B:

And in some cases you really need to clear out these specific types of senescent cells in order to affect a certain disease area, et cetera, et cetera.

Speaker B:

So it took work, but then it took work narrowing down the narrative.

Speaker B:

And here we are, we have a longevity company in clinical trials, which is a great example.

Speaker B:

It's honestly the road that the other should go and the other should follow.

Speaker A:

And they're doing super well because two years ago, I think Beiersdorf, the big German skincare company, agreed a partnership with them.

Speaker B:

Yeah, they did.

Speaker B:

I think it was one of their first industrial deals.

Speaker A:

e that partnership started in:

Speaker B:

Well, a lot of this is confidential to Rubido.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

What I can say is that looking at their latest phase two data in kurtosis, they are actually improving the condition by double digit percentages.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Which is, which is extremely good and it's safe.

Speaker B:

So they're basically posting both efficacy data, early efficacy data, and safety data, which will hopefully end up in either a, an industrial partnership, fingers crossed for that one.

Speaker B:

Or in essentially reaching the market or entering phase three on their own.

Speaker B:

But I think Rubedo is kind of geared up for somewhat of a bright future as a case in our field.

Speaker B:

Be it, you know, an acquisition story, be it a listing story, be it a big funding round story.

Speaker B:

I don't know.

Speaker B:

But definitely some sort of success is going to come.

Speaker A:

And I just want to explain to the listeners that don't know about what Rubedo does.

Speaker A:

It produces an eczema treatment in effect.

Speaker A:

Right.

Speaker B:

Rubedo went after skin conditions first and foremost.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So they're, they're.

Speaker B:

One of their indications is keratosis, acidic keratosis, which is a pre melanoma condition.

Speaker B:

And then I believe they have other programs but, but they went after local indications first and topical indications first, which is much easier to prove.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And it is also much faster to prove as well.

Speaker B:

And it is much easier to recruit for these clinical trials as well.

Speaker B:

So it was actually a pretty, a pretty clever move.

Speaker A:

It's the only right move to do because you can't tackle them all at once and you have to unfortunately do it one by one to, to get the meat approved.

Speaker B:

I guess you can do multiple programs at once.

Speaker B:

It's just you.

Speaker B:

The question is, can you raise this.

Speaker A:

Much money and also you can split them off earlier and get some ROI on, you know, the intermediate work.

Speaker B:

You can out license things.

Speaker B:

Yeah, you can sometimes if you have multiple programs and these programs are performing well, you can out license them at some point.

Speaker B:

Yeah, that's true.

Speaker A:

So how much do you usually invest in those companies?

Speaker A:

I think it's something around half a million or so.

Speaker A:

But is there, do you have a fixed number?

Speaker B:

That was the first fund.

Speaker B:

So the first fund could go up to like maybe one and a half miles.

Speaker B:

The second fund can go up to five US dollars.

Speaker A:

That's where I think the bracket has moved now to.

Speaker A:

Because I don't think you can really achieve that much with much less than, you know, 2 million or.

Speaker A:

How do you, how do you see that?

Speaker A:

Is it worth investing?

Speaker B:

Well, it's always, it's always worth investing.

Speaker B:

It's, it's, it's kind of the, it's the matter of, of the stage.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So, so it depends on which stage are you playing at.

Speaker B:

If you're playing at Series B, then investing 5 million doesn't make any sense.

Speaker B:

Investing 10 million very often doesn't make any sense either.

Speaker B:

It's just from the point of view of how much capital you are deploying out of the fund and how much upside do you still have?

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

If you're playing early stage, then let's say a 5 million check is a lot of money.

Speaker B:

That's most of the round or sometimes the whole round if we're talking pre seed seed stages or early animal work.

Speaker B:

So it all depends on where's your forte in terms of where do you come in.

Speaker B:

What is true though is that the inflation I think hit our industry pretty bad in terms of devaluing the money.

Speaker B:

If you look at the round size dynamics and essentially the amount of work that you can do with a certain amount of money, you have exploding round sizes and then you have deflating progress at the same time, or rather deflating time of how much can the company last with this raised money?

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So before that, you know, with 20 million raised, 30 million raised, you could do a lot of work already in clinical, right.

Speaker B:

You could, you can do, you can do a full IND enabling IND submission phase one and be very comfortable.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

These days you multiply it by two in some cases.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

In certain disease indications.

Speaker B:

So a lot of companies are trying to mitigate this by strategically thinking about things which, which we love as an investor as well.

Speaker B:

Very often if the company sees fit, you can go after rare disease indication.

Speaker B:

And rare disease indications are fast tracked by the fda, especially if there is no approved treatment or you know, any sort of standard of treatment out there.

Speaker B:

If you demonstrate some sort of efficacy, they will be fast tracked and you will essentially end up at a fraction of a cost, at a fraction of a time.

Speaker B:

You will end up with a, A, an asset in the clinic already or approved even better.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Or maybe even out licensed as a result of it.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

And this is how you finance all of your, let's say bigger disease indication work or all of your platform work.

Speaker B:

So all of these strategies became even more applicable I guess in the modern day and age because the money became less valuable, I would say in our field, definitely.

Speaker A:

So what percentage of the portfolio typically receives follow on capital from the fund?

Speaker A:

And how do you decide if a company gets it or not?

Speaker B:

Almost all of them, actually.

Speaker B:

Almost all of them.

Speaker B:

The way you do it is let's say you reserve 5 million per company, you deploy, you know, maybe 1 or 2 million upfront and then you reserve most of it for follow ons.

Speaker B:

The road is long.

Speaker B:

There are pro rata rights, there are pay to play term sheets.

Speaker B:

These days, they're very popular, all sorts of things.

Speaker B:

There are bridge funding events.

Speaker B:

There are, the company can, can get into like some sort of a liquidity crunch where it needs a bridge and you need to step in as an investor.

Speaker B:

And sometimes that condition has Nothing to do with the progress or the quality of the company.

Speaker B:

It's just they needed to spend more money for whatever.

Speaker B:

Or again, coming back to what we've talked about with prepaying services, they just got into a trap of, you know, we need to spend now, otherwise we're not going to be able to do clinical work one year ahead.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

So a lot of things can happen.

Speaker B:

So you just reserve most of the capital for the follow on.

Speaker B:

How do we decide if the company progresses according to the milestones and we see how this ends up being a more valuable, more proven story?

Speaker B:

We would back it up or we would continue backing it up.

Speaker B:

We would, sometimes we would not follow on or we would not follow on more than our pro rata.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

For example, if the company does a huge jump in valuation, which is like we have invested at 20 million pre money, the next round is at 400 million pre money, which is sometimes the case, we will do our pra, you know, as much as we can, et cetera, but we will not meaningfully participate because at this point of time it just doesn't make mathematical sense for us.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

We'd rather stay at our low purchase price and call it, yeah, it depends.

Speaker B:

But generally, if the company's performing well, we would continue supporting it.

Speaker A:

And how closely is your team involved in lending the companies a guiding hand in how they proceed, what they should do, what they shouldn't do?

Speaker A:

Would you just give them free rein and say, you know, just come back with the results?

Speaker B:

No, you don't, you don't do that.

Speaker B:

I mean, you don't give them free reign.

Speaker B:

With early stage biotech investing.

Speaker B:

The rule of thumb here is you help as much as you can, but you don't interfere.

Speaker B:

Which means VCs are not in the business of running companies.

Speaker B:

VCs are in the business of investing in companies and helping these companies to, to run themselves.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

Which means you help with connections, you help, you help with scientific advisory board, you sometimes sit on the board, you sometimes be an observer on the board, depending on the round structure and whatnot.

Speaker B:

But regardless, absolutely regardless of whether you're a minority industry, you're a majority industry, or a board member, you're not.

Speaker B:

If you have a connection, if you have an introduction to make, you make that introduction, you can speed things up for the company, you speed things up for the company.

Speaker B:

So your usefulness, quote unquote, is not really determined by any formal position that you hold or you don't with the company's board or any sort of any sort of management.

Speaker B:

Then in the cases where the company is failing, I mean, again, two, two different scenarios, like if you are on the board, then you have duties to perform, right.

Speaker B:

If you are not, or you don't step in to run the company, you know, some investments just fail.

Speaker B:

That's okay.

Speaker B:

And they're written off.

Speaker B:

That is also okay.

Speaker B:

That is, that is the nature of, of venture capital investing to begin with.

Speaker B:

But yeah, you, you try to be as useful as possible.

Speaker B:

Very trivial answer, but.

Speaker B:

And, and it doesn't really matter who you are on the cap table.

Speaker A:

I just asked that question because, you know, we have a lot of startups and researchers listening and I think it's really helpful for them to know what they can expect, what they get, because some think, you know, they just get money thrown at them and that's it, you know, they'll come back every six months to give reports.

Speaker A:

And others think that they're not just getting money, but buying, you know, real advisory and all that.

Speaker A:

So I'm happy you clarified that.

Speaker A:

It's, I guess, a middle path between those two.

Speaker B:

Well, it's not that what they can expect, it's actually what they should expect and they should expect help from their investors.

Speaker B:

But then as much as you are doing, or me as a fund is doing due diligence on you as a company, you should be doing your due diligence on me as well.

Speaker B:

Right?

Speaker B:

This is where the whole relationship between VCs and founders is a bit crooked in Europe and it's kind of healthier in the U.S. so in the U.S. you have this dynamic very often where it's kind of the even playing ground, which is, you know, a VC comes in, I give you capital, you give me the right or the privilege essentially to, to, to participate in your company and something that you are building.

Speaker B:

So, so it's a fair, it's a fair exchange.

Speaker B:

Right?

Speaker B:

And now we're in the same boat suddenly.

Speaker B:

Right?

Speaker B:

So, so everyone is kind of rowing in the way that, that he can really, you know, whatever help there is, everyone is rolling.

Speaker B:

In Europe, you have this weird power dynamic between VCs and founders very often where VCs tend to like, look down on the founders where they somehow assume that they are superior or, or which they're not.

Speaker B:

They're.

Speaker B:

They're absolutely not.

Speaker B:

Right.

Speaker B:

In fact, running a fund is the same as running a startup.

Speaker B:

You're raising money, you're, you're pitching, you're raising money, you're trying to convince people in your thesis and then you're trying to produce a return on that thesis.

Speaker B:

So it's basically startuppers backing startupers.

Speaker B:

It's just slightly different setup on both ends but, but realistically it's the same thing.

Speaker B:

So, so in, in, in us this, this power dynamic, I, I think it's more even.

Speaker B:

It is very transactional, which is okay.

Speaker B:

Reciprocity is expected.

Speaker B:

It is okay.

Speaker B:

So like a very quid, quid pro quo type of thing in, in Europe it's I'm superior than you are type of thing, which is unhealthy.

Speaker B:

We don't like it typically.

Speaker A:

Yeah, I love what you just said and it really sums up the whole business.

Speaker A:

And you're right.

Speaker A:

The investors in Europe often forget that it's win, win you with your money.

Speaker A:

You can't make more money unless the company you're investing in makes money.

Speaker A:

This is so interesting and informative and everything could have talked to you much, much more on this whole topic because it's such a.

Speaker A:

Interesting and sort of wide topic.

Speaker A:

But we've come to the end and I have to ask you, like I do with everybody, my five rapid fire questions.

Speaker A:

What's the single best piece of advice you would give your younger self?

Speaker B:

So whatever you want to achieve, at whichever point you'll try to obtain advice on how to achieve something, only take this advice from people that have already achieved the thing you're trying to do.

Speaker B:

That's so.

Speaker B:

So to not take money advice from poor people and vice versa, it just takes you a mile, honestly.

Speaker B:

But also do not listen to advices that much.

Speaker B:

Just, you know, if you feel something, if you feel something, do something.

Speaker B:

That's about it.

Speaker A:

Name one habit everyone should adopt for a longer, healthier life.

Speaker B:

Joy.

Speaker B:

Being happy or trying.

Speaker B:

Trying to be happy.

Speaker B:

Like I'm tempted to say like discipline or some bullshit like that, but.

Speaker B:

But in reality and realistically it's just being happy about your life that, that's the number one.

Speaker A:

If you weren't in, well, the wider sense, the longevity science, what career would you have chosen?

Speaker B:

I'd still go for an md.

Speaker B:

I think an MD would be great.

Speaker A:

What microdose habits, sort of five minute routine or small daily action yields outsized longevity benefits.

Speaker B:

Well, it's not for you microdose, but daily exercise does.

Speaker B:

If you form like a neural path in your brain that you need to do something like literally something every day that would take you a mile.

Speaker B:

And I'm not saying like power with thing every day or something, but be active even for a short while, that would just give you immense advantage and.

Speaker A:

What's the craziest longevity myth you've encountered?

Speaker A:

And is there any truth to it?

Speaker B:

I think that it's the notion of that we are actually close to longevity escape velocity.

Speaker B:

Like, we're close to living forever, or rather, being able to prolong our life to the exact amount of years we have lived.

Speaker B:

I still think it's a myth.

Speaker B:

Like, it's a cool gimmick.

Speaker B:

Like, it's a cool populistic gimmick to talk about.

Speaker B:

But realistically, man, I mean, we're.

Speaker B:

We're not.

Speaker B:

We're not even close, right?

Speaker B:

Another good myth is that you can actually do something good for yourself by injecting your yourself with stem cells made somewhere in Mexico.

Speaker B:

But that is not something you should do either.

Speaker B:

It is a very popular myth in a.

Speaker B:

In a community of biohackers, but you should not pursue that at all.

Speaker B:

But, yeah, I think it's.

Speaker B:

In all seriousness, I think it's the longevity escape velocity.

Speaker B:

I think we're not there yet.

Speaker A:

I'm with you on that one.

Speaker A:

There's still lots to do before that.

Speaker A:

Melissa and Stege, thank you so much for being a guest on Beyond Lomja.

Speaker A:

It was really.

Speaker A:

It was fabulous to have you on.

Speaker B:

Thank you for having me.

Speaker B:

It was fun.

Speaker A:

One of the clearest things to come out of this conversation is just how much uncertainty sits behind the science that eventually becomes a successful treatment.

Speaker A:

A drug can work in mice and fail in humans.

Speaker A:

A company can have exciting science but weak IP or no realistic route through clinical trials.

Speaker A:

And an entire field can spend years pursuing an idea that eventually proves far less useful than people hoped.

Speaker A:

Sergey's answer is to be much more rigorous about where the risks are taken and to keep asking whether the science can ultimately become something useful for patients.

Speaker A:

He's also strikingly skeptical about some of longevity's biggest claims.

Speaker A:

He does not believe we are close to longevity escape velocity.

Speaker A:

And he argues that medicine still has much more immediate problems to solve first.

Speaker A:

And when I asked him for one habit for a longer, healthier life, his answer was surprisingly simple.

Speaker A:

Joy, trying to be happy with your life.

Speaker A:

For someone whose work is built around analyzing complex science companies and treatments, it was a very uncomplicated answer.

Speaker A:

Sa.

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About the Podcast

Beyond Longevity
Decoding the future of ageing one conversation at a time
Beyond Longevity explores the science, medicine, technology, business and policy shaping longer, healthier lives. Host Daphna Stern speaks with leading researchers, clinicians, founders and experts about ageing biology, healthspan, preventive medicine, longevity biomarkers, AI in healthcare, nutrition, women’s health and the societal impact of longer lives. Each episode examines the evidence, separates credible science from hype and translates complex research into clear, practical conversations.

About your host

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Daphna Stern

Born in Germany, but predominantly raised and educated in Oxfordshire and London.

Studied Law in London and also earned a Diploma in Clinical Nutrition and Health, reflecting a long-standing curiosity about how the body works.

Developed a lifelong fascination with health, wellbeing and optimisation of body and mind, which naturally evolved into a deep interest in longevity science.

Lived internationally, Monaco, the United States, Hong Kong, and Germany, before returning to London almost 15 years ago, gaining a broad global perspective on health, lifestyle, and ageing.
Mother of two, which further shaped a practical and long-term perspective on health, resilience, and wellbeing.

Not a scientist by training, but over the years has become deeply immersed in the longevity world through constant reading, learning, and questioning.

Well connected within the field, with a strong network of researchers, scientists, clinicians, investors, and innovators who are shaping the future of longevity.
Passionate about blending science, real human stories, and emerging ideas, and about translating complex research into clear, engaging conversations.

Founded Beyond Longevity to explore the future of health, ageing, and longer living, offering listeners cutting-edge research, meaningful insights, and actionable takeaways.
Driven by a belief that longevity is not just about living longer, but living better, and that understanding the science empowers people to make informed choices about their health.

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